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Overview
In late 1999, Congress enacted financial modernization
legislation that dramatically deregulated the financial services
industry and expanded the powers of financial institutions in the
United States. In keeping with this deregulation and expanded
powers, the regulatory landscape and enforcement mechanisms also
changed. While many applaud this legislation, others point to
previous U.S. experience where financial deregulation over-
whelmed federal regulators and resulted in massive failures of
financial institutions and, consequently, in huge federal bailouts.
We examine here, the prospect of supplementing regulation with
certain forms of private intervention. Specifically, we address the
question: Is there a role for whistleblowing and bounty hunting as
means of supplementing existing regulation in the financial services
industry?
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I. Introduction and History
Generally, governmental agencies bear the responsibility for
overseeing the activities of financial services in the United States.
Frequently separate agencies assume jurisdiction over the various
industry groups and occasionally several agencies regulate a single
industry. For example, in the United States the Federal Reserve
Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Comptroller of the Currency all regulate. some of the functions of
most commercial banks. The Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") has primary regulatory authority over investment banking
and the markets for the purchase and sale of securities. On the
other hand, no federal agency has general regulatory authority over
the insurance industry, rather each of the states has an agency that
regulates insurance in that state.
Conflicts and turf skirmishes between or among agencies arise
with respect to overlapping authority. Both the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission and the SEC, for example, have
sought to regulate the same financial products. Recently, the US
enacted the Financial Modernization Act of 1999,' a statute that is
likely to blur the lines between the jurisdictions of various
regulators. This Act removes historical barriers that precluded
participation in multiple financial services sectors by a single
company.8  As industry participants expand their activities in
response to the Financial Modernization Act, a single company may
find itself subject to examination by increasing numbers of
regulators; however, at the same time, regulators may find
themselves overwhelmed by the numbers of industry participants
the regulators must oversee. In addition, technological advances,
especially the internet, as well as globalization of economic activity
make the regulatory task diffuse and unwieldy.
Effective regulation may depend not only on enforcement by
governmental agencies, but also on a number of private inter-
ventions. For example, as financial services become increasingly
complex, regulators may find themselves relying heavily on industry
participants, trade groups and private, industry-funded specialists to
assemble data and develop rules and oversight methodologies. In
7. Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999);
See discussion infra Part II.
8. Banking Act of 1933, §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32, 12 USC §§ 24, 78, 377 and 378
(1994 and Supp. II 1997) (repealed 1999) known commonly as the Glass-Steagall
Act, prohibited commercial banks from engaging directly or through affiliates in
investment banking or insurance underwriting. See discussion infra Part II.
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the United States, we have a tradition of encouraging the market
participant to regulate itself by adopting internal systems that
require its managers and employees to comply with the law. To a
limited extent, each industry may bear part of the regulatory
burden through industry oversight groups and self-regulatory
organizations. Industry groups commonly wield considerable
authority to regulate their members' activities and discipline their
members for violating industry norms. In the learned professions,
professional associations define and enforce professional standards
and licensing, thereby enabling the profession to guard against
outside regulation while regulating the profession from within.9 In
the United States, self-regulatory organizations always have played
major roles in the examination and licensing of brokers and dealers
in the securities industry and maintenance of the securities
markets."° Regulatory dependence upon the industry regulated
exposes the public to market-driven regulatory standards rather
than standards defined by consumer protection. Dependence also
increases the risk that industry participants will be able to conceal
improper behavior and practices from the regulators. When added
to the inherent complexity and intricacy of the industry, active
concealment and the ability of the industry participants to influence
rule making will further diminish effective regulation. At the same
time, the U.S. financial services industries have enjoyed diminishing
government oversight over the past several decades, as the
economy has grown stronger. This trend toward less government
interference and less funding for regulation seems likely to
continue."
Regulators may not have the budget necessary to investigate
and prosecute violations of the laws the regulators administer.
Even when they choose to investigate or prosecute, regulators may
have to depend upon information the industry supplies. This
dependence gives the industry, even in the presence of self-
regulatory authorities, the opportunity to slant its data in order to
display itself and its organizations in a favorable light.
9. The American Medical Association, for example, actively engages itself in
the examination and licensing of physicians.
10. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are examples of such self-regulatory organizations.
11. Occasionally serious threats to financial stability elicit cries for increased
regulation, but more restrictive laws generally have not materialized. Consider the
outcries following Barings Bank's insolvency in 1995 and the enormous loss
incurred by the hedge funds under Long Term Capital Management's investment
management following the Russian default in August, 1998.
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Regulators will find that they need help in identifying and
gathering information concerning improper activities. Public
awareness and participation in regulation are critical to combat the
loss of effective government regulation and the inability of the
regulators to meet increased demand and complexity of regulation.
Non-governmental organizations may serve as private regulators by
investigating and publicizing questionable activities within their
areas of interest in order to limit abuses by the industry
participants." In addition, greater participation in regulation by the
general public through such non-governmental organizations and in
other manners can complement and enhance the efforts of the
government regulators.
The role of the private citizen in law enforcement or regulation
has a long history both in Great Britain and the rest of the world.
Whether this tradition springs from a conscious decision to give the
local population a feeling of direct and personal involvement in the
affairs of the government by various sovereigns or a simple decision
to employ a cheap and ready supply of law enforcement "officers"
is unimportant; what is important is that this practice has been a
prominent feature of the law enforcement landscape and is likely to
continue as a feature of law enforcement. From proclaiming the
"hue and cry" throughout the wapentake or hundreds in medieval
Britain to the present-day Federal False Claims Act, 3 the local
citizenry finds itself more or less involved in the law enforcement
process that promises either a fine or amercement for failing to
participate actively in the former case or a bounty for active
participation in the latter.
Trial by jury may also be viewed in this context, and the Magna
Carta (cap. 39) was not the first example of an effort by various
authorities to bring the concept of local participation and "social
pressure" into law enforcement. In addition to the aforementioned
provision of the Magna Carta, one could look to the edict of
Emperor Conrad 11 (1037) that provided that military tenants were
not to be deprived of their fiefs "except by the laws of our ancestors
and the judgment of their peers.' ' 14 In England, the same principle
12. For example, Greenpeace has played an active and confrontational role
worldwide in order to protect the environment. On a more local level, the
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, better known in the
U.S. as ACORN, recently has enjoyed some success in addressing lending abuses
by sub-prime lenders.
13. Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. See discussion infra
Part IV.B.
14. See J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 75 (1965, reprint 1969).
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is to be found in a proclamation of Henry I along with an
interesting jurisdictional addition: "... each man is to be judged by
his peers of the same neighborhood."'5
In the United States, direct citizen participation in the law
enforcement process appears in various vigilante movements.
Brown defines vigilantism as " ... organized [and] extralegal move-
ments, the members of which take the law into their own
hands..."6 Whatever the ulterior motive(s) of these various
movements, they seem to have flourished wherever formal law was
either weak or non-existent (e.g. the frontier of the American West
from about 1840 to the early 1900s) or where there was a clash of
values or legal systems.
In the Pre-Revolutionary Southern United States there is
evidence of the activities of the South Carolina Regulators from the
late 1750s onward. During the earlier years of this movement one
could conclude that "the law" was weak or completely non-existent,
but during the immediate Ante-Bellum period the target of the
Regulators seems to have been exclusively the members of the
Abolitionist movement indicating a clash of cultures or values.
However, the most famous (or notorious) of these movements are
to be found from about 1840 in the vast empty plains of the West-
present-day Montana, Wyoming and the Dakotas (an area roughly
the size of Western Europe with a current population of less than
2,000,000). It was here that "the law" was what the dominant
culture said it was, and the real question seemed to be: "what is the
dominant culture?" Further evidence of vigilantism may be found
in the Temperance Movement of the late-19th and early-20th
Century where one observes private citizens acting in concert (a
mob) for the purpose of eradicating a perceived evil (beverage
alcohol).
Wherever these movements sprang-up, whether in San
Francisco of the 1850s and 1860s or in Vermont in the mid-1880s or
elsewhere throughout the mid- to late-19th Century and into the
early 20th Century United States the theme(s) seem to be the same:
1) a real or perceived weakness in the warp and woof of the legal
system or system of "moral values"; and 2) a more-or-less
spontaneous uprising of the local population. Two further
observations may be noted: 1) the victorious culture got the
15. Id. at 76.
16. RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: STUDIES IN
AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 95 (1975).
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advantage of cheap law enforcement; and 2) the local citizenry got a
feeling of meaningful participation in the process.
While the days of vigilantism may be past, even in the
Information Age of the 21st Century, the individual continues to
have a role in law enforcement. Legislators at state and federal
level have incorporated citizen participation into statutes defining
regulation of a variety of industries. Given the need for public
assistance to regulation in the financial services sectors, this paper
addresses the question of whether whistleblowing and bounty
hunting can play meaningful roles in the regulation of financial
markets and financial services industries.
Whistleblowing and bounty hunting are discrete activities.
Bounty hunting is a business and involves professionals like
investigators and attorneys who are sensitive to the amount of
compensation offered for their services. Whistleblowing, on the
other hand, is an intrinsically personal activity. Incentives may
increase contacts with informants but any correlation between the
amount of the reward and the volume and quality of information
received is less direct than the correlation between compensation
and bounty hunting activity. Moreover, whistleblowers often
require protection more than they need payments for their services
and effective protection is more difficult to provide than money.
With laws designed for this purpose, financial market regulators
may expect enforcement assistance from both whistleblowers and
bounty hunters.
In examining whistleblowing and bounty hunting, part II of the
paper introduces the new financial services legislation in its
historical context and warns of the dangers it poses to the integrity
of the financial services market. Parts III and IV examine
regulatory models that focus on the role of the private citizen. Part
III offers analysis of whistleblowing and its social and economic
framework in order to provide a better understanding of its possible
functions and limitations. Part IV proposes expanded utilization of
a variety of bounty hunting models as a means to enlist active, non-
governmental participation in regulating financial services. Finally,
Part V concludes that bounty hunting offers great promise in
regulation but carries with it substantial risks of extortive settle-
ment if allowed to operate without controls. Whistleblowing, on
the other hand, also carries risks and is far less likely than bounty
hunting to provide reliable regulatory assistance.
[Vol. 19:1
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II. History of Legislation in Financial Services Industry
A. The Glass-Steagall Act of 193317
Following explosive growth fueled in part by speculative
lending in the 1920s, the U.S. Stock Market crashed in October
1929, signaling the beginning of the great depression. From the end
of 1929 to the beginning of 1933, over five thousand banks-20
percent of the banks in the United States-failed. This condition
lead to enactment of the "Banking Act of 1933," part of which
commonly is known as the Glass-Steagall Act. Among other
things, Glass-Steagall prohibited the payment of interest on
demand deposits and authorized the Federal Reserve Board to
regulate interest rates payable on savings and time deposits. The
Act also provided for greater regulation of the banking system by
the Federal Reserve and prohibited banks and the affiliates of
banks to engage in investment banking activities. It also introduced
federal deposit insurance and set the stage for a tightly controlled
regulatory environment that would continue for the next several
decades.
A fundamental result of this legislation enacted in the 1930s
was the division of permissible activities among the various
financial institutions and the division into compartments of the
financial sector. Neither banks nor affiliates of banks could engage
in brokerage and other security market activities. Of course,
securities firms could not engage in banking. Savings and loan
associations could not offer demand deposits, nor could they make
commercial or most other types of loans. They were restricted
almost totally to the making of home mortgage loans in their local
market. Credit unions, established in 1934, could not accept
demand deposits and were largely limited to the provision of credit
to people "of small means" (according to the 1934 Federal Credit
Union Act18).
By the 1970s, depression era conditions had faded from the
minds of the American public. Federal deposit insurance and
financial regulation had accomplished the objective of restoring
confidence and of reducing bank and other depository institution
failures to a fraction of their former numbers. 9 Indeed, the
17. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32, supra note 8.
18. Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1751 - 1795 (1988).
19. In 1934, the number of bank failures declined to sixty-one. Beginning in
1943 and for the next three decades the number of bank failures was less than ten
per year.
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regulatory authorities followed the practice of merging failed
institutions with stronger ones, so that deposit and other creditor
losses were virtually eliminated. While safety was the primary
focus of earlier legislation, quality and price of financial services
became the principal issues by the 1970s. The division into
compartments of the financial sector was questioned, and a number
of government-mandated studies were released. Many of these
studies called for deregulation and greater reliance on market
forces.
B. Winds of Change
The 1970s and particularly the late 1970s witnessed severe
inflation, interest rate increases, and financial market chaos that
threatened the solvency of sizable components of the financial
sector. Substantial disintermediation occurred as depositors
transferred funds from savings and time deposits in financial
institutions to newly created money market funds. Money market
funds merely combined sums received from savers and invested
those funds into money market instruments that were not subject to
regulatory imposed interest rate ceilings. Fund managers were able
to pass along high market returns to investors in the funds. Subject
to interest rate restrictions on their deposits, depository financial
institutions were unable to compete on a price basis with interest
rates generated by the money market funds. This, together with
certain other developments led to passage of The Financial
Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.
C. The Financial Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980'0
The 1980 Act, commonly referred to as the Monetary Control
Act, was undoubtedly the most sweeping piece of financial
legislation since the Banking Act of 1933.1 Among other things,
the law provided for the elimination of interest rate ceilings on
deposits held by financial institutions, and thrift institutions
(primarily savings and loans) were permitted to invest in consumer
loans, commercial paper, and corporate debt securities. The thrust
of this deregulation was to establish a "more level playing field"
within the financial sector, to reduce the compartmentalization of
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 248, 248a, 342, 355, 360, 374b, 412, 461,463, 505, 1425a (1988).
21. See supra note 8.
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depository financial institutions, and generally to, allow greater
flexibility within the financial sector.
Importunely, conditions in the 1980s were such that the
financial sector became plagued with problems. Thrift institutions
took advantage of their new powers and began to restructure their
portfolios, with many expanding into higher risk commercial
lending and into consumer lending programs where their
experience was limited. The net worth of the savings and loan
industry fell by 22 percent between 1980 and 1982, and hundreds of
savings and loans were merged. In the face of this continuing crisis,
Congress enacted (October 1982) major legislation titled The Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 198222 to "shore up"
savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks. This 1982
act also sped up deregulation initiated by the Monetary Control
Act of 1980 and generally expanded the deregulatory environment.
Because of rapid growth and expansion in areas beyond the
expertise of many thrift managers, a number of these institutions
experienced great difficulties. Inexperience with new areas of
lending, weakly collateralized loans, outright fraud, and interest
rate volatility contributed to an S&L crisis in the 1980s. By 1987,
the federal insurer for S&Ls, the Federal Savings and Loans
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) depleted its assets and reached the
point where it could no longer afford to close down insolvent S&Ls.
Funds were no longer sufficient to reimburse depositors and incur
other expenses frequently associated with closing and merging
failed institutions. Consequently, Congress, in August 1987,
enacted the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, a key
feature of which was the reaffirmation that insurance by the FSLIC
or by the FDIC represents the "full faith and credit" of the United
States. Also, by the late 1980s, commercial banks were expe-
riencing difficulties. The combination of a depressed energy
industry and problems in the agricultural sector had resulted in
enormous losses for large numbers of banks and thrifts. By
September 1987 the volume of bank failures was double the
previous year's pace.
22. The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 98-
181, 97 Stat. 1237 (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
23. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat.
552.
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D. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA)24
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 (FIRREA) laid the groundwork to restore the
public's confidence in the savings and loan industry. It abolished
the failing FSLIC and transferred to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) the responsibility of insuring the deposits of
thrift institutions. The FDIC insurance fund created to cover thrifts
was called the Savings Association Insurance Fund (FDIC-SAIF),
while the fund covering banks was called the Bank Insurance Fund
(FDIC-BIF). The FIRREA also raised deposit insurance pre-
miums, created the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to regulate
the thrifts, and created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to
liquidate failed thrifts. Within a few years of the passage of this
Act, hundreds of financial institutions, primarily thrift institutions,
were closed at a cost to U. S. taxpayers of several hundred billion
dollars.
E. The Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act)25
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the U.S. financial
sector has undergone dramatic change over the past few decades.
Severe inflation and interest rate volatility in the 1970s were
followed by financial market deregulation in the 1980s. Financial
institutions, consequently, began to experience new opportunities
and new risks. Commercial lending activities, loans to businesses
funded by relatively short term customer deposits, the margins from
which were once the mainstay of banking, began to take on reduced
importance. In this new environment, the management of risks
associated with financial assets and liabilities, began to take on ever
increasing importance. Interest rate volatility led to new and
sophisticated financial innovations such as interest rate swaps, caps,
futures and other derivative financial instruments. These
innovations and many other new developments in financial markets
were made possible with the advent of increasingly powerful
computer technology together with the development of new and
24. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, Pub.L. No. 103-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C. and
18 U.S.C) [hereinafter FIRREA].
25. The Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub.L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 [hereinafter Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act].
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highly sophisticated software. Efficiency in the financial sector, it
was reasoned, called for greater linkage of the activities of
commercial banks, securities firms, insurance firms, and merchant
banking. Greater linkage however, was precluded by the
Depression era Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1933)26 since it
separated permissible activities conducted by commercial banks vs.
investment banks vs. insurance companies and merchant banking.
Thus these new developments and opportunities left many to
conclude that existing financial legislation was outdated and was
stifling the efficient advancement of financial markets and
activities.
On November 12, 1999, laws separating banking, investment
banking, and insurance activities for United States institutions were
effectively removed with the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act. This new financial modernization law allowed for the
formation of financial holding companies (FHCs), which are
permitted to engage in "any activity that is financial in nature."
The FHC may therefore engage in activities including but not
limited to bank lending, insurance underwriting and other
insurance activities, merchant banking, investment banking, broker-
age and other securities activities. Importantly, deposits held by
banks owned by the FHCs will continue to be federally insured.
While many applaud the new legislation and point to the need for
modernization of the U.S. financial system, others point to
increased risk to the insurance fund and indeed to an increase in the
level of systematic risk (the risk of widespread economic failure
caused by the demise of one or a few large institutions).
According to provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
regulation of these new FHCs will be functional in nature. For
commercial banks, federal banking regulators will supervise
traditional banking operations. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission will supervise securities activities of banks. State
insurance regulators will supervise insurance activities by these
same banks.
In the new regulatory climate of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
regulators will require assistance in designing regulatory structures
and identifying law violators. Whistleblowers may provide valuable
help in the latter category.
26. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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III. Whistleblowing: Risks and Limitations
A. Introduction to the Concept of Whistleblowing
The term "whistleblower" carries more positive connotations
than other terms assigned to people engaged in similar activities.
Like informants, tattletales, snitches, and stool pigeons, whistle-
blowers disclose information concerning wrongful, illegal, or
dangerous activities or behavior. The recipients of the information
have direct or indirect27 authority (whether or not legitimate) to
prevent or punish the activity or behavior. Because whistleblowers'
access to information generally flows from their close relationship
with the wrongdoers, as employees, co-workers, insiders of various
types, and even family members, whistleblowers risk retaliation
from the wrongdoer-dismissal, demotion, ostracism, blacklisting.
These personal risks to the whistleblower lend credence to the
disclosure and suggest that the informant's motivations are
altruistic.
Unfortunately, whistleblowing is not always unselfish and its
revelations not always accurate. As with other informants, the
whistleblower's motives may be selfish or evil as well, and the
information provided may be false or incomplete. Like a child who
informs on a sibling to a parent or on a classmate to a teacher,
motivations may be as disparate as (i) a sense of an obligation to
inform, (ii) the wish to see the other punished, (iii) avoidance of
punishment, (iv) hope for reward, (v) the desire to protect the
wrongdoer from injuring himself or (vi) the aspiration to become a
hero. So long as the information is sound, its recipient should be
indifferent to the informant's motivations.
However, it may not be simple to discern the reliability of
information. Sometimes, perhaps frequently, the informant's
motivations are so compelling that the informant becomes
untrustworthy and provides falsified or embellished information. A
recipient who is not suspicious of the informer's motives may fail to
test the information adequately. Even when tested, the task of
distinguishing useful from defective data is especially difficult when
information is secret.28 In addition to issues of reliability, whistle-
blower information suffers from other vulnerabilities. For example,
27. News media are examples of indirect authority, in that, the media intend
their public exposure of the wrongdoing to motivate those with direct authority to
commence enforcement or the wrongdoer to modify his or her behavior.
28. Consider lago in Shakespeare's Othello.
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where the whistleblower acts from self-interest, powerful offenders
may enjoy immunity because they can control potential informants
through threats and rewards. 9 If enforcement efforts rely heavily
on the data informants provide, unbalanced and selective enforce-
ment may result. Predominantly, those wrongdoers who lack the
power and resources to control the flow of information will be
punished.
Unless compensations and protections offered whistleblowers
are sufficient to counter the rewards and punishments proffered by
influential wrongdoers, whistleblowing is unlikely to prove effective
except as an occasional and incidental aide to enforcement. In the
financial services industries, discovery of impermissible behavior
through informers probably will be serendipitous and rare because
violators tend to have resources with which to buy off the
prospective informants. Moreover, fear that the wrongdoer will be
able to injure the whistleblower's opportunities for future employ-
ment and advancement deters all but the most steadfast, indignant,
and angry informants. Thus in the absence of a significant personal
stake for the informer, the balance will likely tip in most cases
against informing. ° The disgruntled employee here and there who
is willing to provide information as a form of revenge will surface,
but anger may motivate him or her to falsify or embellish data.
Despite its limitations, whistleblowing can be an important
enforcement tool. Whistleblowers conserve government resources
by focusing investigations and providing secret data or keys to
understanding available data that otherwise may have been
obtained only at an extremely high cost. Recognizing these useful
roles informants play, agencies devise methods to encourage
informing. Direct monetary rewards for information resulting in
the arrest and conviction of offenders became common in 19th
Century America. More recently, private interests have offered
rewards in order to assist law enforcement agencies in appre-
hending criminals and draw attention to specific criminal activity
where the private party has a particular interest in seeing that the
criminal is punished."
29. Consider the recent book and motion picture: The Insider that deals with
the whistleblower (not spy, not stool pigeon, not tattletale) who blew the whistle
(not informed) on the tobacco industry.
30. Compare and contrast sexual harassment and the reluctance of injured
parties to come forward even where there is personal interest in and immediate
impact on the informer.
31. See, e.g., the $5000 reward offered by the Philadelphia Daily News in 2000
for a "tip leading to the capture and conviction" of Iriana DeJesus's killer. The
same article invites additional contributions to the reward fund.
2000]
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Similarly, many police departments have a small discretionary
fund available to pay informants. Non-monetary payments such as
informal agreements not to refer minor criminal offenses for
prosecution if the alleged criminal provides information concerning
more serious crimes are common. More elaborate schemes include
immunity from prosecution in exchange for information concern-
ing, and testimony against others whom the agency considers more
desirable targets for prosecution. In financial markets, the best
informers are likely to be individuals who have participated in the
illegal scheme, so immunity grants will be critical. Less tangible are
the appeals to patriotism. Governments as diverse as Nazi
Germany, the Soviet Union and the McCarthy-era United States
persuaded their citizenry that informing on friends and neighbors
was a patriotic duty. Accompanying the encouragement to inform
was the threat that one who failed to inform would be viewed as no
less guilty than the wrongdoer. Along the same lines but benign are
rules of conduct for professionals requiring them to disclose wrongs
of which they become aware.
32
But most important is developing the trust of informants who
want assurance that the governmental agency is not corrupt -that it
will not pass the informant's information and identity on to the
wrongdoer. Altruistic informers want their risks not to be in vain.
They want certainty that the agency will utilize the information
provided effectively and to the detriment of the wrongdoer.
Penalties must not be nominal lest the next whistleblower decide
that blowing the whistle is futile and refrain from acting.
32. With respect to lawyers, attorney-client privilege prevents attorneys from
disclosing confidential communications except to prevent substantial bodily injury.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 (1981). Some state rules require
disclosure of confidences to prevent perpetration of the client's fraud. Similarly,
see Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (observing that attorneys
are not required to blow the whistle but must accept liability if their client uses the
attorneys' opinions in perpetrating a fraud). More recently, the SEC has argued
for much broader primary liability for attorneys when they prepare offering
documents for clients. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143 and 97-1261 (3d Cir. Filed March 9, 1998). If the
SEC's standard is adopted, lawyers would have to blow the whistle publicly in
order to avoid primary liability if they participate in preparing offering documents.
Sec. 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires auditors to design
procedures to ferret out illegal acts of their audit clients and compels their
disclosure to the SEC.
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B. Protecting Whistleblowers
Essential to successful enlistment of informers is a means to
protect them from retaliation. Statutes prohibiting landlords from
evicting or refusing to renew leases of tenants who report housing
violations are common. Similar legislation prohibits employers
from dismissing employees for disloyal acts such as reporting health
and safety violations by their employers. Such protections are
essential to any plan to encourage people with accurate information
to come forward. Likewise guarantees of anonymity for informants
and witness protection programs to provide informers with new
identities have been indispensable to prosecution of organized
crime.
There are a number of legal avenues through which the risk
may be reduced. In recognition that employees are vulnerable to
discharge or other retaliation if they choose to come forward with
information contrary to the interests of their employers, various
legal protections have evolved. Although there is no single legal
safeguard that applies to all employees in all whistleblower
situations, there is precedent in several states for the application of
common law doctrines to protect the employee. In addition, there
are a number of state and federal statutes that provide
whistleblower protections.33 In addition, state and federal civil
service laws similarly protect public employees from arbitrary
personnel decisions and provide a mechanism for redress. And,
public employees who refuse to sign oaths pledging to support
federal and state constitutions, may not be summarily dismissed
without a hearing or inquiry required by due process.3
When American labor unions secured the right to organize and
to bargain collectively during the 1930s, one of the key ingredients
of collective bargaining agreements was a clause prohibiting the
arbitrary discharge of workers. This "good cause" requirement
obligated employers to have a reasonable basis for terminating
employees. Collective bargaining agreements also established
33. There are at least 26 federal statutes that provide protection for
whistleblowers or contain anti-retaliation provisions. Included among these are
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-650; Asbestos
School Hazard Detection Act of 1980, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3611; Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9627 (2000); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)(2000); Juror's
Employment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (2000); and Occupation Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
34. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
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grievance processes that provided workers with a means of
resolving work-related disputes. The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 35 gave powerful protection to employees participating in
union activities and collective bargaining by prohibiting employers
from discharging employees who participated in peaceful union
activities or who gave evidence in proceedings to enforce the
NLRA.36
At greatest risk are those employees who have no specific
contractual protection of their employment. These so-called "at
will" employees may leave or be discharged at any time for any
reason or no reason. Exceptions to the "at-will" employment
relationship have been promulgated by statute and common-law.
These exceptions either encourage or affirmatively protect
employees who take actions detrimental to their employers'
interests. State courts have sought to protect the employment
status of "at-will" employees under public policy exceptions to the
general rule. Courts have long recognized that an employees may
not be discharged for refusing to commit crimes under an
employer's direction. Another public policy exception protects the
whistleblower from retaliatory discharge. Under this exception,
employers are prohibited from discharging workers who report
violations of the law committed by the employer or fellow
employees. Besides a breach of contract remedy, several states also
allow the employee to file an action in tort for wrongful discharge;
the contract remedy recovers lost earnings while a tort claim allows
for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.
The protection of the whistleblower was established to support
an individual's civic duty in promoting public health, safety and
welfare by encouraging workers to report the unlawful activities of
their employers. In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.," the
Illinois Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for wrongful
discharge for an employee who had been discharged after reporting
a fellow employee's criminal activities. After his discharge, the
worker filed suit against his employer and the Court found that
allowing the summary discharge of workers for reporting unlawful
conduct would be contrary to the public interest and would deter
the reporting of such conduct.
35. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§151-169.
36. DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE 1-2 (1991).
37. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E. 2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
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Similar reasoning can be found in Garibaldi v. Lucky Stores.3"
In that case an employee was discharged after reporting to a local
health department that his employer intended to ship contaminated
milk. The worker filed suit challenging his termination. The Court
held that employees could not be discharged for reporting unlawful
conduct because of the public interest that is served by assisting
authorities in law enforcement efforts. Several states have adopted
similar exceptions to the at-will tradition.
In the wake of several highly publicized reports of
whistleblowing and the subsequent retaliation against federal
employees, Congress enacted several statutes that protect federal
employees who report misconduct. The federal laws have the same
purpose as the public policy exceptions to the "at-will" employee
doctrine carved out by state courts; they are designed to encourage
the disclosure of unlawful activities and so aid in the protection of
public health safety, and welfare from those who would engage in
unlawful conduct. 3
C. Whistleblowing's Adverse Consequences: Conflicting Duties and
Social Displacements
Even if we believe that there may be some advantages to using
employees as agents of law enforcement, the potentially adverse
consequences cannot be ignored. The possibility that an insider
may become an informant creates inherent adversity in the
employment relationship, forcing a more formal and legalistic
relationship between employer and employees. This adversity
breeds tension and disruption in the workplace, undermining the
cooperation and collaboration among employees necessary to
productivity.
The choice to become a whistleblower requires the employee
to overcome legal and moral duties of loyalty to the employer. The
open communication and trust essential to a productive organiz-
ation are undermined as the whistleblower advances the case and
the employer assembles the defense. As the employee's whistle-
blowing activity becomes known, conflicts may also arise between
the whistleblower and other employees. Investigations often create
pressures and suspicions that may cause irreparable strains in
38. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F. 2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985).
39. See Whistle Blower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1213 (1994) and
Civil Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 111 (codified in various
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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relationships among employees. Co-workers feel the tensions and
may be drawn into attempts by the whistleblower to gather
evidence against the employer, or by the employer to cover up
evidence or to discredit the whistleblower.
While the employer-employee relationship may be a casualty
of whistleblowing, there are also potential financial impacts on the
organization. In addition to the costs associated with lost product-
ivity and negative publicity, an organization facing allegations of
wrongdoing has costs in conducting an investigation, mounting a
defense, and potentially paying penalties if infractions are found.
In the face of these risks to the organization, an opportunistic
whistleblower is in an excellent position to extort a settlement from
the employer.
The potential adverse consequences of whistleblowing are not
limited to disruption of the workplace or to severe negative
financial impact on the organization. Although one of the purposes
of encouraging whistleblowing is to keep an organization in
compliance with laws, ironically, whistleblowing may have a
contrary result. The whistleblower himself may be guilty of
wrongdoing. It is not uncommon for a whistleblower to copy or
remove documents or other evidence from the employer's
premises. And since the whistleblower may be a participant in the
wrongdoing, in an effort not to reveal his intentions, he may
continue improper practices while gathering evidence to use against
the employer. Finally, it may be in the whistleblower's interest to
allow the employer's wrongdoing to continue so as to create a case
of greater magnitude.
In the ideal, whistleblowing can present a deterrent to
wrongdoing; however, it may cause extreme disruption to the
productivity of a business and may, ironically, prolong the wrong-
doing. In addition, whistleblowers usually fare badly in these
situations. Managers and co-workers view them with suspicion and
distrust. They are seen as troublemakers and threats to the stability
and financial well-being of the organization. Whistleblowers are
often ostracized by their fellow workers. In most cases it is
impossible for a whistleblower to regain the trust and confidence of
colleagues. Thus, neither the protections from adverse employment
actions established by whistleblower laws, nor incentives offered to
these informants can remedy the harm that is done to workplace
relationships.
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D. Federal Whistleblower Reward Programs
Experience with whistleblowing rewards on the federal level in
the U.S. is limited. The Internal Revenue Service has enjoyed some
success with its reward program.4° In 1998 for example, the Internal
Revenue Service collected nearly $84 million as a result of whistle-
blowing and paid nearly $7 million in rewards for information.41
Information on the number of false leads is not available. Other
federal reward programs have proven less valuable.
Both FIRREA42 and the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank
Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 19904' establish
rewards for information leading to a criminal prosecution or the
recovery of restitution or a civil penalty for violations under the
Acts. FIRREA also provides protection for employees who act as
"whistleblowers." To date, there has been no award under these
bounty statutes, possibly because the criminal and civil penalties
under the Acts have had a general "chilling" effect on financial
institutions."
In 1988, Congress enacted the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act.45  The Act strengthened existing
prohibitions against insider trading and authorized the Securities
and Exchange Commission to award bounties to "the person or
persons who provide information leading to the imposition" of
penalties for insider trading.'  The bounty cannot exceed ten
percent of the penalties imposed in a given case. Furthermore, the
awards are entirely discretionary; the SEC's decision in a given case
is not subject to judicial review. The regulations allow informants
to remain anonymous unless disclosure is essential to the public
interest. Despite the expectation of the legislation's authors, the
40. I.R.S. Pub. No. 733 (1997) (authorizes rewards for information provided by
individuals to the Internal Revenue Service); Payment may be up to $2 million; see
also, Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(b)(2) (1999).
41. Daniel Currell & Marsha Ferziger, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics
and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1151
(1999) (referred in the following as Snitching). Sources from the Internal Revenue
Service suggest informally that the bulk of whistleblowers are disgruntled spouses
with disgruntled employees a close second.
42. See FIRREA, supra note 24.
43. The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer
Recovery Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4849.
44. John R. Rowlett, The Chilling Effect of The Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and The Bank Fraud Prosecution Act of
1990: Has Congress Gone Too Far?, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 239 (Winter, 1993).
45. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, 15 U.S.C. §78
(2000).
46. Id. at §78u-1(e) (2000).
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SEC's bounty program has not proven to be an effective weapon in
the agency's enforcement arsenal. By 1992 the SEC had paid only
one bounty and the program was considered dormant by 1999."7
E. Whistleblowing Summary
At best then, whistleblowing produces only occasional
enforcement assistance and sometimes even will be detrimental to
enforcement by distracting authorities with unreliable data.
Perhaps whistleblowing's most useful role is as a deterrent. One or
two major disclosures of wrongdoing might persuade otherwise
arrogant market participants that it is difficult to hide their
wrongdoing and convince them that they are not invincible; thereby
encouraging compliance with regulatory precepts. Taking all the
factors into account, it nevertheless may be desirable to encourage
whistleblowing so that it will play some role in policing the financial
services industries.
IV. The Business of Bounty Hunting
While whistleblower laws primarily protect employees from
discharge or other acts of retaliation by the employer, there are also
laws that provide inducements to expose wrongdoing.' Among
these laws are those which prompt citizen behavior that has been
termed bounty hunting. In its various manifestations, bounty
hunting has a more promising role to play in policing the financial
services industry than does whistleblowing. While whistleblowing
provides information to enforcement authorities, bounty hunting
supplements governmental enforcement activity with active private
intervention. Like whistleblowers, bounty hunters conserve the
47. See Ferziger et. al., supra note 41.
48. Included among the federal bounty statutes are: Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 103-73, 103 Stat. 183
(authorizes cash awards for reporting violations of federal banking statutes);
Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4849 (added new financial crimes and
increased the penalties for existing bank crimes); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3729-3733 (imposes liability upon any person who defrauds the federal
government); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C § 78u-1(e)
(authorizes SEC to award a bounty to a person who provides information leading
to the recovery of a civil penalty from an insider trader, from a person who tipped
information to an insider trader, or from a person who directly or indirectly
controlled an insider trader); U.S. Customs Bounty Scheme, 19 U.S.C. § 1619
(authorizes cash awards for original information on child pornography, export
control and embargo enforcement, anti-drug initiatives, vehicle and cargo theft,
and asset forfeiture programs).
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government's investigatory resources by identifying wrongdoers.
Unlike whistleblowers, bounty hunters frequently participate
actively in apprehending and prosecuting offenders, thereby
conserving governmental policing and prosecutorial resources as
well. In order to encourage bounty hunters to play this active role,
the financial rewards for bounty hunters must be substantial while
protection from retaliation may not be necessary.
A. Historical Perspectives
Bounty hunting has a noteworthy history. Sovereigns offered
bounties to enlist the services of influential subjects. When the
subject was instrumental in facilitating the capture, defeat and
death of the opponent, the sovereign would give the loyal subject
the titles and all or part of the income producing lands previously
held by the vanquished opponent.49 In the early democracy in
medieval Iceland, there was no governmental authority with
prosecution and punishment functions. Prosecutions were private.
The convicted criminal forfeited his property to the prosecutor. In
order to muster support for the prosecution, the prosecutor offered
shares of the criminal's property to the prosecutor's supporters in
the prosecution." Nineteenth century America saw the growth of
vigilante justice and the development of a cottage industry of
professional bounty hunters who made their livelihood capturing
wanted individuals for the rewards offered. The industry inheres to
this day."
B. Modern Manifestations of Bounty Hunting-Sharing the
Government's Bounty
Contemporary U.S. law offers a limited array of direct
bounties for private assistance to public enforcement of law and a
49. Veterans of the American Revolutionary War were entitled to land grants
for their service. See New York State Archives: Applications for Land Grants
("Land Papers, 1st Series"), 1642-1803, volumes 37-3.
50. See, for example, Hrafnkels saga, which, although now generally
considered a work of fiction, describes in detail the private nature of criminal
prosecution and execution of judgments in medieval Iceland.
51. See Christian Parenti, Psycho Bounty Hunters: Enforcers of the Bail
Industry, the Progressive Media Project, (1997) (addressing the Phoenix, Arizona
killings of two individuals by professional bounty hunters. The much-publicized
incident led to greater regulation of bounty hunters in Arizona) available at
http://www.progressive.org/mpparentisept.htm (last visited March 26, 2001). For
an alternative view praising the significant role bounty hunters play, see John A.
Chamberlin, Note: Bounty Hunters: Can The Criminal Justice System Live Without
Them?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175 (1998).
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panoply of incentives to direct private enforcement of law where
private injuries occur. The first category, direct bounties, is no
longer the "wanted dead or alive" type. Rather a very limited
number of statutes encourage private litigants to report illegal
activities and initiate legal action to enforce state remedies by
providing a specific payment or a share of the state's recovery to
the private litigants. 2 Other statutes reward reporting only rather
than permitting active intervention, fitting better into the category
of whistleblowing than bounty hunting. 3
Statutes that permit or encourage private citizens to initiate
legal proceedings on behalf of the government are "qui tam" laws.
Qui tam actions based on bounty statutes pay financial rewards to
bounty hunters. Thus a party who files an action based on a
bounty statute receives a reward as an incentive for whistleblowing
and initiating the action and is protected from retaliation. The
False Claims Act is the best known and most effective "bounty"
statute.5 The False Claims Act was originally enacted during the
Civil War by President Lincoln following reports of fraud and
corruption by defense contractors including Unions soldiers
opening crates supposedly containing muskets only to find sawdust,
and stories of the same horses and mules sold to the different U.S.
Cavalry units. 6 Some states, including California, Florida, Illinois,
Louisiana, Tennessee, Texas and the District of Columbia, have
enacted false claims statutes modeled on the federal FCA that also
contain qui tam provisions. "
With considerable regularity, private parties initiate
investigations and claims for recovery under the False Claims Act.
The False Claims Act imposes civil liability on "[a]ny person" who,
52. See Federal False Claims Act, supra note 13.
53. See I.R.C. § 7623 (2000).
54. The term "qui tam" is an abbreviation of a Latin phrase that translates
literally into "he who as much for the king as for himself."
55. See Peter Aronson, Critics Gripe at Suits: Claims U.S. is Cheated out of
Billions, NAT'L L.J., August 9, 1999, at Al. The Department of Justice reported
that $2.91 billion was recovered by the federal government in False Claims cases.
In 1999, 483 cases were filed with a total recovery of $485 million. In the same
year the average recovery in False Claims cases was $5.8 million. The average
relator recovered $1 million. Since 1986 more than 2,700 suits have been filed.
During that period a total of $403 million has been awarded to relators.
56. Kent D. Strader, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers: Should Counter-
claims Against Quit Tam Plaintiffs Be Allowed in False Claims Act Cases?, 62 U.
CIN. L. REV. 713,728-229 (1973).
57. John C. Ruhnka, Edward J. Gac & Heidi Boerstler, Qui tam Claims:
Threat to Voluntary Compliance Programs In Health Care Organizations, 25 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y L. 283, 288 (2000).
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"knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval."58 Violators are potentially liable
for treble damages and civil penalties of up to $10,000 per claim.
The Act authorizes private parties, designated as the "relator," to
bring qui tam civil actions "for the person and for the United States
Government" against violators, "in the name of the Government." 9
The government may intervene or assume control of the lawsuit
and the private party receives a specific sum or a portion of the
government's recovery.60
In qui tam cases, the actions of the defendant/wrongdoer
generally do public harm only. Private injury is incidental.61  Since
bounty hunting in these instances involves legal action, it, unlike
whistleblowing, necessitates the services of a lawyer. Thus,
contemporary bounty hunters employ lawyers or are lawyers
themselves. Those who are not attorneys look to the reward as a
source of payment for attorneys' fees.62 If the reward is small, the
lawyers are unlikely to be willing to represent the plaintiff for a
share of the reward. Unless the plaintiff is sufficiently outraged by
the wrongdoer's activities to be willing to pay from her own
resources, she may have difficulty securing representation and must
leave the action to the discretion of the governmental agency with
general enforcement authority. In order to facilitate the bounty
58. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
59. Id. at § 3730(b)(1). Of course, to initiate a proceeding under the Act, the
federal government also can file a civil action directly against the claimant. Id. at §
3730(a).
60. When a private party brings an action, the individual must deliver a copy
of the complaint, and any supporting documents, or other evidence, to the United
States Justice Department. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) and (4). Thereafter, the
government has sixty days to decide whether it will initiate a civil action. If the
Justice Department elects to proceed it has primary responsibility for prosecuting
the action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1). In such cases, however, the relator is allowed
to participate as a party to the litigation and to share in any judgment that may be
obtained. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2). If the government declines to intervene, the
relator has the right to proceed without the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4).
The relator is entitled to receive 15 to 20 percent of the proceeds from the
judgment if the government proceeds with the action or, 25 to 30 percent if it does
not, plus attorney's fees and costs. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) and (2).
61. Clearly, fraud on the government has non-governmental repercussions in
costs to the citizenry, but the cost to any specific individual tends to be difficult to
measure and speculative.
62. The US rule requires each party to bear its own attorneys' fees. Where
anticipated recoveries are sufficiently large, many attorneys in the US work under
contingent fee arrangements and receive a portion of the recovery but nothing if
there is no recovery. The rule in the UK, for example, is different; the losing party
pays both parties' fees.
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hunting activities of private litigants, many modern statutes provide
for the government to pay the successful litigant's attorneys' fees or
require the losing defendant to pay.63
C. Modern Bounty Hunting: Private Remedies
Unlike the False Claims Act and the Internal Revenue Code
that include provision to criminalize and punish those who do harm
to the public pocketbook,' laws regulating financial markets
address actions that may inflict no direct damage to governmental
revenues but nevertheless do both public and private harms. The
private injuries are economic. The public injuries are perhaps more
insidious in that they undermine the integrity of the marketplace
and the public's confidence in the regulatory process. Securities
laws, for example, seek to assure the public a fair marketplace by
requiring disclosure of all material information relating to the
security by those who are selling it. Without accurate and complete
information, the party lacking accurate information is at an
economic disadvantage relative to the party with complete
information. Lending limits and related banking regulations
protect the financial institution's depositors from the loss of their
invested funds if the institution engages in risky lending practices,
including the failure to diversify. Similarly, monopolization does
private harm both by eliminating price competition and causing the
consumer to pay more for goods and services than a competitive
price. It also destroys the economic viability of the monopolist's
potential competitors.
In many instances of securities law violations, the economic
injury to any single plaintiff is small and insufficient to attract
contingent fee-based, legal representation. Since most instances of
use of non-public information to trade securities or other types of
market manipulation involve many purchases and sales with small
economic injuries to each participant, the ability to join multiple
claimants renders the potential damage pool significant. The class
action lawsuit in the U.S.65 has proven an effective enforcement tool
in instances of multiple small claims. Class actions permit the
aggregation of similar claims into a single lawsuit. If the suit is
63. Note that many modern statutes from civil rights laws to consumer
protection provide incentives to private law enforcement by shifting the burden of
attorneys' fees to the vanquished defendant.
64. Of course, there is private injury in that taxpayers collectively bear the
government's loss from fraud and tax cheating.
65. See FED, R. Civ. P. 23 (2000) (governing class action lawsuits in federal
courts).
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successful, the court determines what portion of the recovery (or
settlement) pool the plaintiffs' attorneys will receive for their
services based on time devoted to the case and the risks that the
case might not be successful. While the court has considerable
discretion to decrease the attorneys' fee application, the fees in
large class actions tend to be sufficient to attract a ready supply of
qualified class action attorneys. The attorneys' fee award
frequently dwarfs the damages each member of the class receives.
Although attorneys' codes of conduct may limit the ability of the
class action specialists to promote litigation,' in many respects, it is
plaintiffs' lawyers as contemporary bounty hunters who support
and accomplish the objective of privately enforcing the law.
In addition to class action suits, statutory punitive damages
provide incentives for private enforcement by raising the stakes for
the wrongdoer. Most economic crimes like monopolization,
securities fraud, illegal banking practices rarely result in imprison-
ment of the responsible party.67 Without any serious threat of
imprisonment, economic crime in many instances is a matter of
economic assessment. If detected and prosecuted, the issue for the
offender is the cost of the punishment and civil liability. Perhaps
the offender also loses face in the community, but negative impact
on reputation is usually slight when the prosecution is civil rather
than criminal. Even when the available remedies to the injured
parties are only recovery of provable losses, perhaps plus interest,
the wrongdoer may not even have to disgorge his entire profit-
hardly an effective deterrent. In the U.S., Congress sought to
enhance the deterrence and encourage private prosecution by
trebling damages for monopolistic practices.' Under the antitrust
laws, the injured competitor whose damage may be less than the
monopolistic profit stands to capture a windfall from a successful
prosecution. Moreover, the opportunity to receive multiple
damages makes the injured competitor more willing to share the
award with the contingent fee attorney. And the attorney and
client together pursue the bounty.
66. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco De La Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2nd Cir. 1999)
(discusses the doctrine and its continued validity but finds it inapplicable and
reverses the lower court).
67. The occasional high visibility prosecution-like Michael Millken-results
in jail time and may deter other potential violators. However, most criminal
prosecutions result in fines and set the stage for civil claims. Incidentally, a
whistleblower provided the government with the first evidence of Milken's illegal
activities.
68. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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Both the class action and multiple damage models require the
quantification of the private injury. In some cases, both public and
private damage is speculative or nominal. For example, failure to
disclose material facts or false statements in the initial offering of
securities may do little or no damage where the securities
appreciate in value. Nevertheless, non-disclosure or false
statements undermine the underlying structure of the regulatory
system. While fines or other direct criminal penalties may be
appropriate, that type of enforcement consumes governmental
resources. The best alternative might be to encourage private
enforcement by authorizing exemplary damages and requiring
losing defendants to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees.69 Much civil
rights type legislation adopts this methodology. °
Bounty hunting models in use in the U.S. today include all the
methods introduced above: payment from government collection,
class actions, multiple damages, punitive damages, and attorneys'
fee awards. Legislation adapting each model to financial markets
and services would bolster limited governmental enforcement
resources by enlisting private persons in the enforcement of the
regulatory structure.
V. Conclusion
Each bounty-hunting model requires the active participation of
the bounty hunter. She must make a tangible investment of her
personal resources to capture the reward. As in any business,
judgments concerning deployment of resources will follow
customary decision-making processes. The bounty hunter will
evaluate cost, likelihood of success and potential gain. This analysis
controls and limits the incidence of unfounded claims. Rational
evaluation often does not determine the whistleblowers election to
act. While the costs to the whistleblower may be as significant, they
are less tangible. Rational decision-making conduct may be
clouded by the personal motives that lead the whistleblower to
report falsely.
Because bounty hunting is not altruistic, some may object to
the windfall provided to successful bounty hunters because they
view bounty hunting to be an unsavory activity. Moreover, given
69. Id. at § 1681(n) (Attorneys' fees and punitive damages for consumer credit
reporting violations).
70. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and § 2000(e)(5) (2000),
(violations of the Civil Rights Act entitle successful plaintiffs to punitive damages
and attorneys' fees).
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the cost of defense, targets of bounty hunters, even if innocent of
wrongdoing, may find it less expensive to settle the claim, thus
encouraging unfounded lawsuits. As the importance of bounty
hunting to financial services regulation grows, it may become
necessary to review the frequency of extortionate, unfounded
claims. If such claims become common, solutions such as the
shifting of attorneys' fees and expenses to parties advancing
questionable claims might suggest themselves.7" Fee and expense
shifting to losing plaintiffs is problematic. It threatens the very
activity, bounty hunting, by rendering it potentially unprofitable. In
that case, fee shifting may drive some of the best bounty hunters
out of business and there will be no effective private regulation.
Nevertheless, increased use of bounty hunting models in
financial market regulation may become essential to enforcement.
Clearly systems to encourage voluntary compliance within each
financial service provider's organization and management's
commitment to compliance offer the best assurance that the
financial services industry will maintain its integrity and protect its
consumers and resources. Bounty hunting, with its threat of
significant monetary cost and potential individual liability, compels
managers to develop efficient, internal legal compliance
mechanisms. Thus, bounty hunting, like whistleblowing, has a
deterrent effect and an immediate and powerful role to play in
protecting the integrity of the financial markets-but not to the
exclusion of governmental enforcement. Whistleblowing, on the
other hand, remains largely supplemental and serendipitous. It is
far less likely to play a material role in market regulation than is a
well-designed array of bounty payment structures.
71. Under current US law, courts may order plaintiffs to pay the defendants'
fees and costs when the claim is frivolous.
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